LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL

An extremely interesting article for weekend reading of my civilian friends and those in media. Enjoy this lucid, pacy article.

Have a great weekend mulling tover it.

LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL IN LADAKH One is surprised at the information being fed to the Public, on the subject. Statements made by Government officials do not appear to be taken seriously. It is felt that the perspective needs some clarification. Those who might have seen the Indian Borders in Punjab, Jammu region, the Line of Control in J&K, Siachen, or in the North East at Nathu La etc would imagine the LAC in Ladakh to be similarly held. This is not so. Our defences here are at places that are tactically sound and logistically sustainable. There is no ’eyeball to eyeball’ contact, in Ladakh. The areas forward of the defences are patrolled as per policy but patrols cannot cover an entire length of the LAC to prevent patrolling by the adversary, particularly when we do not wish to escalate the situation in pursuance of Government policy. Any attempt to consider areas visited by our patrols as defence posts would repeat the basic mistake of 1962, when most unsuitable non tactical positions were occupied due to a misplaced belief that the Chinese would not attack. Army generals accepted this from the GOI and paid heavily for the same; even the PM lived to regret formulating that policy. Yet, have we learnt any lessons from that experience? Unfortunately we have not; because we have not yet found the moral courage to face the truth. Accepting mistakes made in the past would be the first step to learning. The report on 1962 by Lt Gen Henderson Brooks continues to gather dust in South Block. Some reports in the Media linking the Army’s routine operational alerts to activities such as Chinese patrolling are misleading the Public. Even if the op alerts were not a routine affair they can do nothing to prevent Chinese patrols coming across our perception of the LAC. People must be aware that there have been a number of agreements between British India and the government in Tibet, in the last two centuries. While we may have inherited our positions from the British the Chinese certainly do not honour the agreements made by Tibet in the past. The alignment of the Border between India and China remains to be resolved. Sardar Patel, in a letter of 07 December 1950, had warned the Indian PM of Chinese intentions but these warnings were ignored. A most impractical Forward Policy was ordered which Gen Thimayya refused to implement in 1959. It was implemented only after the retirement of Gen Thimayya. The result was a most humiliating defeat in 1962. On 21 November 1962 the Chinese announced a cease fire which involved a 20 km withdrawal from the Actual Line of Control on that day, in Ladakh, and across the “illegal” McMahon Line in the East. (That is what the Chinese called it). The implication is quite significant. Though India did not agree to the proposals the same were implemented. Indian proposals at that time were rejected by the Chinese. The Indian Leadership at the time could not think of any other options. In Ladakh there is no single line which can be called the Line of Actual Control. Our perception of the Line is different from the Chinese perception. Hence there are two lines. Both countries continue patrolling to their own lines. This has carried on for years and will not stop till the difference in perception is resolved. Talks to decide the boundary issue have made little progress. Since these are under discussion giving details of these would not be in National Interest. However one thing we may note. The Chinese have always patrolled up to what we perceive is their version of the LAC. Never beyond that. But what is their perception of the LAC? In the absence of any line being indicated by the Chinese, we have to conclude that the line upto which they patrol is their claim line. Drawing attention of the public to the number of patrols is as meaningless as IAF transport aircraft landing 23 km from the LAC. What is important is that there have been no clashes or face offs. (From the point of view of stopping incursions). For defence of our territory against conventional threat we are more than a match for the Chinese all along our land borders. This includes use of our Air Power. Even in 1962, had the Higher Direction of War been better, the Indian Armed Forces could have given them a bloody nose, even with the forces available at that time. One can say that it is easy to comment with hindsight. One must understand that the intention is not to only criticise past leadership. The intention is, to remind everyone, that we better learn our lessons from all past wars. It should be common knowledge that Nuclear Deterrence needs better Direction of War at the Higher level. With knowledge of conduct of all previous wars including OP VIJAY in 1999, one observes that the Higher Direction of War has been a major weakness in all our wars. Maybe we got away in the past because our adversaries were equally bad if not worse. I wonder whether we will enjoy a similar advantage in future, against all possible adversaries. For the current problem, hyped by the Media, one must realise that the Indian Army, on its own, cannot stop the Chinese patrolling unless the GOI clearly orders it to do so, accepting the consequences. The more informed public may like to place their faith in all Government agencies dealing with the situation with a hope that the Border issue with China will be resolved at the earliest.

The above views are the author’s own.Lt Gen KK Khanna, PVSM, AVSM**, Veteran The Indian Army